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B
usiness schools and
popular discussions of
the corporate world
tend to place huge
stress on the
importance of good
management in top performing
companies. Economists, meanwhile, have
had relatively little to say about the role of
management in driving productivity and
other key performance indicators. This is
largely because until now, there has been
an absence of good quality data on
management practices measured in a
systematic way across countries and firms.
A new report – by CEP’s Nick Bloom
and John Van Reenen, and Stephen
Dorgan, John Dowdy and Tom Rippin, all
consultants at McKinsey – attempts to fill
this void, using an innovative survey
approach to measure management
practices in more than 730 manufacturing
firms in France, Germany, the UK and the
United States. By matching these data
with information from firm accounts, they
are able to explore in detail the
relationship between management
practices and company performance.
Overall, the report finds compelling
evidence that better management
practices are significantly associated with
higher productivity and other indicators of
corporate performance, including return
on capital employed, sales per employee,
sales growth and growth in market share.
This is true in both the Anglo-Saxon and
the continental European countries,
suggesting that the researchers’
characterisation of good management
practice is not intrinsically biased towards
UK and US approaches.
Across the whole sample, a
conservative estimate indicates that
differences in management practices
account for a significant proportion – 
10-20% – of the differences in
productivity between firms and between
countries. This figure may actually be
substantially greater, which raises the
question of why there is such variation in
the management practices and
productivity of competing companies –
and, in particular, how badly managed
firms are able to survive, often for years.
Measuring management
practices
Measuring management requires codifying
the concept of good and bad
management into a measure applicable to
different firms within the manufacturing
sector. An interview-based management
practice evaluation tool that defines and
scores from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best
practice) across 18 of the key
management practices was used, which
appear to matter to industrials firms based
on their expertise in working with
thousands of companies across several
decades. The 18 practices fall into four
broad areas:
■ Shopfloor operations: have companies
adopted both the letter and the spirit of
lean manufacturing?
■ Performance monitoring: how well do
companies track what goes on inside
their firms?
■ Target setting: do companies set the
right targets, track the right outcomes
and take appropriate action if the two
don’t tally?
■ Incentive setting: are companies hiring,
developing and keeping the right
people (rather than people they could
do without) and providing them with
incentives to succeed?
For each company in this study,
researchers interviewed one or two senior
plant-level managers, who knew only that
they were taking part in a ‘research’
project. These managers were selected
because they are senior enough to have a
reasonable perspective on what happens
There are wide and persistent differences in
productivity across firms and countries.
A new CEP study – conducted jointly with
McKinsey & Company – uses a pioneering
approach to measure management practices
and assess their importance in driving these
variations in economic performance.
Management
practices:
the impact on company performance
in a company but not so senior that they
might be out of touch with the shopfloor.
The interviews relied on open questions
and the interviewers were trained to probe
for details of practices on the ground.
To ensure impartiality, only companies
that had no relationship with McKinsey
were included in the study. And medium-
sized firms, which tend to rely on local
management, were selected in preference
to large firms whose multinational
operations might obscure differences
between countries.
Management practices
across countries
Analysis of the survey data confirms a
range of anecdotal evidence that US
companies are the better managed than
companies elsewhere in the world. As
Figure 1 shows, US firms are statistically
significantly better managed than
continental European or UK firms. The
researchers estimate that the differences in
management practices between the UK
and the United States account for 10-15%
of the productivity gap between the two
countries.
As Figure 2 shows, US companies also
excel even when their operations are
located overseas. The research finds that
US multinational subsidiaries based in the
United States
France and Germany
UK
3.37
3.23
3.08
Figure 1:
Country level management scores
CentrePiece Summer 2005
3
Note: All gaps between country groups are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Average management score by firm type 
in UK, France and Germany
Number in
sample
Domestic
Non-US multinational
subsidiary
US multinational
subsidiary
3.13 379
44
20
3.25
3.58
Figure 2:
Management scores of European firms
Note: The gap between domestic firms and US multinational
subsidiaries is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Some UK firms 
use world-class
management practices
while others are
among the worst
UK, France and Germany are better
managed than either domestic firms or
other non-US multinational subsidiaries
operating in these countries. This suggests
that barriers to foreign ownership and
cross-border deals are likely to be
damaging to the spread of good
management. 
The data also suggest that countries
have distinct management ‘cultures’. For
example, Germans firms excel at
operations management – shopfloor and
process management – while US firms
excel at people management – targets and
particularly incentives management.
Management practices
across firms
On top of the clear national differences,
there is also a huge spread of
management practices across firms in
every country, as indicated in Figure 3. For
example, some UK firms use world-class
management practices while others are
among the worst in the whole sample.
About 50% of this variation is
explained by a firm’s country and industry
pairing, with the remainder due to the
wide underlying distribution of
management practices among firms in the
same country and industry. Most notably,
the data indicate that a large number of
firms are extremely badly managed with
ineffective monitoring, targets and
incentives.
Well-managed firms perform
significantly better than poorly managed
firms, with higher levels of productivity,
profitability, growth rates and market
values. So why do these variations in
management practices persist? The
researchers present three reasons:
■ Product market competition, at the
industry level, appears to be a primary
driver of good management practices.
This could work both by making
managers work harder – an ‘effort
effect’ - and also by driving out badly
performing firms – a ‘selection effect’.
The research finds little evidence for an
‘effort effect’, suggesting that
competition may improve management
practices mainly by forcing badly run
firms to shape-up or close. 
■ A firm’s age also seems to matter with
very old firms having the lowest average
scores for quality of management
practices, particularly those in
uncompetitive industries where
competition does not weed out
underperformers. This is consistent with
the idea that new entrants find it easier
than their older counterparts to adopt
the best management practices of the
era in which they were founded.
■ Stronger labour market regulation
significantly impedes good management
practice, particularly in firms with longer
CentrePiece Summer 2005
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France  (137 firms)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 3:
Firm level management scores
Germany  (157 firms)
1.0
0.5
0
1 2 3 4 5
Product market
competition and weak
labour market regulation
are key drivers of good
management practice
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tenured employees. This suggests that
regulation impedes the adoption of new
management practices.
These factors also play a role in the
national differences in management
practices and productivity performance.
For example, countries with lower levels of
competition and tougher labour market
regulation – France and Germany – are
worse managed on average than countries
with weak regulation – the United States.
The UK is something of a puzzle in
this dimension: while it has moderately
high levels of competition and low levels
of regulation, it is the worse managed on
average. One hypothesis that the
researchers hope to investigate in future is
to what extent the UK’s poor
management performance in
manufacturing is driven by low skills, a
common complaint of UK manufacturers?
Overall, superior US management
seems to be driven by lower levels of
labour regulation and a greater degree of
product market competition. Compared
with the UK, the country’s firms also seem
to benefit from higher levels of
management skills.
UK  (154 firms)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5
United States (290 firms)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5
Surveying
management
practices
The interview was
run on an amazing
array of firms.
Products included:
■ Magnetic plastic balls that float on
water near airports to prevent birds
from nesting – this firm reported
facing few competitors.
■ German sex toys (mainly for the
domestic market as tastes vary by
country).
■ Human tissue grafts from corpses –
this firm scored highly on ‘just-in-
time’ production.
And the comments
the interviewers
received included:
■ ‘I spend most of my time walking
around cuddling and encouraging
people – my staff tell me that I give
great hugs.’
■ ‘Improvement process? That's
something that happens once a year
before the Christmas Tombola.’
■ ‘We don’t do KPIs [key
performance indicators]… the only
person I report to is God.’
■ ‘[long silence]… sorry I just got
distracted by a submarine surfacing
in front of my window.’
■ On motivating employees:
‘Forget it… if you 
work here, you drew the
short straw.’
■ To a female interviewer:
‘Your voice sounds really
great, and I love your
accent… are you married 
by the way?’
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This article summarises ‘Management
Practices across Firms and Nations’ by Nick
Bloom, Stephen Dorgan, John Dowdy, Tom
Rippin and John Van Reenen
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/).
Nick Bloom is director of CEP’s research
programme on productivity and innovation.
Stephen Dorgan, John Dowdy and Tom
Rippin are at McKinsey & Company.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Scoring management practices
How is 
performance
tracked?
Firms score 1 if:
measures tracked do not indicate
directly if overall business objectives are
being met, and certain processes aren’t
tracked at all. 
For example:
A US manager who tracked a range of
measures when he didn’t think output
was sufficient. He last requested
reports eight months ago, checked
them for one week, and then stopped
checking once output had increased
again.
Firms score 3 if:
most key performance indicators are
tracked formally, and tracking is
overseen by senior management.
For example:
A US firm bar-coded every product, and
performance indicators were tracked
throughout the production; but this
information was not communicated to
workers.
Firms score 5 if:
performance is continuously tracked
and communicated, both formally and
informally, to all staff using a range of
visual management tools.
For example:
A US firm that had
screens visible to every
line displaying hourly
progress to target. The
manager met daily with
shopfloor staff to discuss
these, and monthly with the
whole company to discuss
overall performance. 
He even stamped 
canteen napkins 
with key performance
achievements.
What are 
your firm’s 
targets?
Firms score 1 if:
goals are exclusively financial 
or operational.
For example:
A UK firm performance targets only
output volume.
Firms score 3 if:
goals include non-financial targets, but
they form part of the performance
appraisal of top management only and
are not reinforced throughout the rest
of organisation.
For example:
For a French firm, strategic goals are
very important. They focus on market
share and try to hold their position in
technology leadership. But workers on
the shopfloor are not aware of those
targets.
Firms score 5 if:
goals are a balance of financial and
non-financial targets, and senior
managers believe the non-financial
targets are often more inspiring and
challenging than financials alone.
For example:
A US firm gives everyone a mix of
operational and financial targets. They
communicate financial targets to the
shopfloor by telling workers that they
pack boxes to pay the overheads until
lunch and after lunch it is all profit for
the business. If they are having a good
day, the boards immediately adjust and
play the profit jingle. Everyone cheers
when the jingle is played.
CentrePiece Summer 2005
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A
quarter of a century
ago, only one quarter
of the workforce had
never been a member
of a union. Since
then, union
membership has fallen by five million and
the corresponding fraction now is one
half. Today, the public sector, where three
in five workers are members, has greater
aggregate membership than the 
private sector, where only one employee in
six is a member.
It is not surprising that union
membership crumbled away in the 1980s
and 1990s. The composition of jobs in the
economy changed so that employment
declined in unions’ traditional heartlands
of manufacturing, mining, utilities and the
public sector. The state did what it could
to undermine collectivism through
successive tranches of industrial relations
legislation, privatisation, contracting-out
and the introduction of performance
related pay for its own employees. 
In turn, employers responded to these
signals and were more likely to oppose
unions – so new recognition became
difficult to achieve.
At the same time, many workers lost
their taste for membership. Unions’ own
structures – ‘male, pale and stale’ – and
policies – notably the pursuit of mergers
seemingly for their own sake –
compounded their problems. What had
previously been conforming behaviour – 
to recognise or belong to a union –
became deviant.
Our book concludes that whether
unions continue in the twilight – or
instead become resurgent – largely
depends on two things: first, what impact
they have on firm performance and
fairness at work; and second, whether the
intersection of what they see as the
malevolent forces of the 1980s and 1990s
continues over the next decade or so.
The impact of unions as a vested
interest is much weaker now than in the
past. The roots of union power – the
closed shop and the strike threat – are
shut down and product market
competition is more intense. As a result,
the evidence suggests that:
∑
■ The average wage mark-up for
unionised workplaces over 
comparable non-union workplaces is
now low or zero.
■ Unionised workplaces no longer have
lower labour productivity than their
non-union counterparts.
■ Therefore, financial performance is, on
average, similar to that in non-union
workplaces, although where the firm
has some monopoly power, a union can
siphon off some of the rent from capital
to labour.
■ But there is no evidence that 
such transfers lower investment rates in
firms and workplaces with union
recognition compared to similar 
Trade unions:
resurgence or demise?
Trade unions have been in decline in Britain for
25 years. A new book edited by Sue Fernie and
David Metcalf – and featuring contributions
from most leading analysts of the labour
movement – takes a generally pessimistic view
of their likely future.
With around 12% of 
privately employed 
workers as members, the
future for private sector
unionisation looks bleak
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non-union organisations – indeed,
investment in skills is stronger in
unionised workplaces.
But there remains one acutely
worrying economic outcome from the
union viewpoint. On average, employment
in a unionised workplace grows 3% more
slowly (or falls 3% more quickly) than in a
similar non-union workplace. Even though
union activity is unlikely to be the cause of
this differential growth in jobs, if it
persists, the implications for future
membership levels are serious. This
evidence suggests that the employer now
has less incentive to oppose unions, but
the worker has less incentive to join.
Unions do continue to wield the
‘sword of justice’: they narrow the spread
of earnings, cut accidents and promote
family friendly and equal opportunity
policies. Furthermore, from around 1870
and for most of the twentieth century, the
share of profit in national income
gradually declined, though this long-run
trend has reversed in the last two decades.
This too suggests a role for unions in
countering exploitation – a return to the
rationale for unions set out by the Webbs
a century ago.
It is unlikely that future employment in
the more highly unionised segments of the
economy – such as the public sector and
utilities – will grow more rapidly than jobs
in private services where union density
(the proportion of the workforce that
belongs to a union) is well below average.
Therefore, the future of unions turns, in
part, on the thorny matter of the balance
between servicing existing members and
organising new ones.
Unions have seven million members,
but 1.6 million of these are not covered by
collective bargaining because, in many
cases, the employer abandoned collective
bargaining without formally
‘derecognising’ the union. Unions face a
hard task convincing such members that it
remains worthwhile to continue to belong
to the union.
Unions must also service their 5.4
million members who are covered by
collective bargaining, the majority of
whom are in the public sector. Key tasks
here include maintaining terms and
conditions and providing services to
individuals, including advice on
employment matters, promoting lifelong
learning and representing members in
employers’ procedures and before 
labour courts.
There are 8.7 million workers covered
by collective bargaining, but 3.3 million of
these are ‘free-riders’, benefiting from
union activity without actually belonging to
a union. Absorbing such workers is a
potentially low cost route to boosting
membership. But much more difficult to
organise are the 14 million employees who
are neither members nor covered by
collective bargaining.
Between 2000 and 2002, unions
achieved a 25-year high in annual
recruitment from this group. But this figure
represented only 1% a year of the total of
unorganised workers and was insufficient
to offset the outflow of members because
of workplace closures and contractions,
redundancies, new free-riders and
derecognitions. And in 2003 and 2004, the
numbers newly organised by successful
recognition campaigns fell sharply.
Employers now have
fewer incentives to
oppose unions – but
workers have fewer
incentives to join them
CentrePiece Summer 2005
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Since New Labour came to power in
1997, the hostile forces of the 1980s and
1990s have largely evaporated. Public
sector employment is rising, the state is at
worst neutral in its dealings with unions
and new state initiatives include
recognition machinery, a national
minimum wage and various family
friendly policies. Almost three million non-
union workers say they would be likely to
join if there was a union at their
workplace. And the union movement has
generated a series of initiatives aimed at
revitalisation.
But despite all this, union membership
is now the same as it was in 1997 and
union density has fallen two percentage
points. One plausible explanation for this
paradox is that when unions were
powerful, they pursued their ‘monopoly
face’ in manufacturing, mining, utilities
and the public sector and they largely
ignored the significant groups of low paid
workers who suffered the worst
inequalities in power and conditions.
Subsequently, that monopoly face has
mostly disappeared so there is less
incentive for such workers to belong to a
union. At the same time, state initiatives
displaced many of the ‘collective voice’
and ‘sword of justice’ activities, including
promoting better grievance procedures,
enhanced rights for part-time workers,
limits on working time, better parental
leave and the national minimum wage. In
addition, both the voice and monopoly
faces of unions have been supplanted by
the huge but largely unremarked
expansion in occupational licensing and
certification, again a state initiative.
In the longer run, the passage of the
European Union directive on information
and consultation may be an important
influence on the future of unions. This
establishes, for the first time, permanent
and general arrangements for information
and consultation for all workers in
organisations of more than 50 employees
and will cover three quarters of the labour
force by 2007. The tough job for unions is
to build on these schemes and to
maintain and expand their role in them so
that they are seen as the legitimate voice
representing employees. Alternatively, this
indirect voice institution may crowd out
the union voice.
Finally, it is worth re-emphasising the
numbers. For the first three years of the
new millennium, unions’ organising rate
was at a 25-year high of 150,000 workers
a year newly recognised. Of these,
perhaps 100,000 – 0.4% of employees –
became union members. Assume that the
net depreciation of density from closures
and lost appetite for membership is 2%
(though, in fact, it was larger than this in
the 1980s and 1990s). In such
circumstances – remember that the
organising figure is probably
overgenerous and the depreciation rate
understated – ‘steady state’ union density
is 20% (0.4/2), implying private sector
density of around 12% of the workforce.
The future for private sector unionisation
looks bleak indeed.
Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise?,
edited by Sue Fernie and David Metcalf and
published by Routledge (2005), summarises
the output from CEP’s five-year research
programme on the future of unions in modern
Britain, which was funded by the Leverhulme
Trust (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/future_of_unions).
David Metcalf, who directed the programme
and was formerly CEP’s deputy director, is
Professor of Industrial Relations at LSE.
Sue Fernie is a lecturer in industrial relations
at LSE. The next four articles summarise a
selection of chapters in the book.
Despite
rising 
public sector
employment
and a variety
of New
Labour
initiatives,
union
membership
is unchanged
since 1997
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Circling the wagons:
unions’ part in their own decline
The conventional explanation of union
decline in Britain tends to stress the impact of outside
forces. Manufacturing employment collapsed and there
was massive membership loss. Unemployment rose.
Hostile legislation impaired unions’ ability to represent
and recruit. In short, macroeconomic and political factors
restricted unions’ ability to sustain the membership
advances of the 1970s across subsequent decades. 
What are the implications of this argument? First, it
sustains the hope of revitalisation: if macroeconomic
conditions generate decline, you wait for their reversal to
stimulate growth. But second, it diverts attention from
union behaviour. Adverse trends in organising success,
resource accumulation and service development are not,
on this argument, predictors of future performance but
merely symptoms of present malaise. 
Since 1997, with better macroeconomic conditions and
more favourable politics, decline has not been reversed.
In the private sector, it has continued apace. Why? 
Union behaviour is important. This is not to discount
outside forces but rather to argue that once decline sets
in, the unions’ response may not only fail to reverse 
it but exacerbate the decline. There are several elements
in the argument.
First, there are no new, big unions. The union ‘business’
consists of a set of large, ‘oligopolistic’ enterprises
seeking to expand into non-unionised sectors but, largely,
failing to do so. Whenever large-scale expansion of
membership has taken place in peacetime, as in the
1880s and 1970s, new and different types of unions have
emerged. They are not doing so now.
Second, mergers don’t work. They don’t bring down
costs, improve organisational performance or attract new
members. On the contrary, they simply generate
organisations that are good at merging. They are
conglomerate federations with limited ability to generate
scale economies and limited incentives to organise the
unorganised. 
Third, unions don’t deliver in the workplace. The private
sector wage differential has disappeared. Employers
seldom rely on union-only arrangements, supplementing
them with consultation and participation. Membership
under collective bargaining has shrunk. Collective
bargaining agendas have narrowed. There are far fewer
union reps around. If an employee is seeking to resolve a
grievance or a firm is seeking to establish better
employee relations, there are non-union alternatives. 
Fourth, unions can’t spend their way out of decline.
Structurally, they have had a long-term revenue deficit of
subscription income over total expenditure, which means
that asset revenue or sales must cover operating
expenditure. Asset bases have slowly declined over the
post-war period to an historical low. Competition
between conglomerates keeps subscriptions down.
Federated structures in merged unions keeps expenditure
up, as does the collapse of workplace representation. 
In short, it is not likely that unions could take advantage
of even the most favourable circumstances for growth
without substantial internal reform. The strategies of
many large unions reflect a need to survive, but growth
strategies might look very different and require different
structures and policies. The first thing you do when you
circle the wagons is uncouple the horses. 
‘Circling the Wagons: Endogeneity in 
Union Decline’ by Paul Willman is a 
chapter in Trade Unions: Resurgence or
Demise? (Routledge, 2005).
Paul Willman is at Oxford University.
Without substantial internal reform, it is
unlikely that unions could take
advantage of even the most favourable
circumstances for growth
Union mergers fail to
bring down costs, fail 
to improve performance
and fail to attract 
new members
in brief...
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The unions could attract public
support for their distinctive vision of
public service provision
Public service unions:
challenges of the reform agenda
The government’s ‘modernisation’
agenda for the public services has put considerable
pressure on unions in the sector, giving them the dual
challenges of articulating a coherent national policy
response and ensuring effective organisation and
representation at workplace level. These challenges are
exemplified in their responses to the private finance
initiative (PFI), which is now the dominant system of
procuring public infrastructure. UNISON estimates that
100,000 of its 1.3 million members have been 
transferred to a private contractor or not-for-profit
provider in recent years.
Union responses have included campaigning against PFI,
lobbying the government for enhanced staff protection to
end the ‘two-tier workforce’, as well as engaging with PFI
implementation at workplace level. And different unions
have had different responses depending on the
occupations and professional identities of their members
and the direct impact that PFI has on their employment. 
While all unions have been willing to follow their
members into the private sector, this has been more
straightforward – organisationally and ideologically – for
those with an established presence in the private sector.
UNISON has recently established a Private Contractors Unit
to provide a co-ordinated approach to organising in the
sector and to target selected companies. This has created
tensions with activists committed to removing private
contractors from the public services. Several unions have
also secured national recognition agreements with big
contractors like Serco and Sodexho. 
In the workplace, unions have found it difficult actively to
engage members as employees are often unsure of the
implications of PFI prior to their transfer to a new facility.
This process is made more difficult because of its technical
complexity and the amount of time union reps need to
commit to analysing complex business cases and
attending project meetings if they are to be able to
influence the procurement process.
An additional complication is the legacy of successive
rounds of competitive tendering. Workers doing the same
work in the same workplace can be employed under a
plethora of different terms and conditions. The strain on
over-burdened union officials in servicing a fragmented
membership is exacerbated by patchy local organisation.
Nonetheless, pressure to extend NHS pay restructuring to
contracted out workers has brought significant benefits
for ancillary workers.
With employees in a single workplace employed by several
different employers, representation becomes more
complex. When an employer provides facilities time to a
public service union rep, it is generally not possible to use
it to represent individuals employed by private contractors.
But if the private contractor provides no facilities time for
its own union rep, then there will be a representation gap,
with the union unable to provide full services to
subcontracted staff.  
The PFI experience has varied widely across workplaces.
There is a strong sense within the union movement that
some private contractors are much more open to union
involvement than others. Where staff are consulted about
design and operational issues, both staff and patients
comment more favourably on new buildings and services.
By contrast, the absence of consultation leads to far less
positive perceptions.
The experience of PFI has highlighted the degree to which
public service unions operate in an environment of
continuous restructuring, in which they have to contend
with numerous public and private sector employers, and
invest in workplace organisation to ensure a visible union
presence that can deal with multiple terms and conditions
of employment. At the national level, the government
needs to be persuaded that the unions have a convincing
vision for the future of public services. But at the same
time, the unions are starting to develop their own reform
principles, which could attract public support for a
distinctive vision of public service provision.
in brief...
‘Union Responses to Public-Private
Partnerships in the NHS’ by Stephen Bach
and Rebecca Kolins Givan is a chapter in
Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise?
(Routledge, 2005). Stephen Bach is at King’s
College London. Rebecca Kolins Givan is at
Cornell University.
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Unions in Germany:
better placed than their 
British counterparts?
Like British unions, unions in Germany
face the serious problem of crumbling membership. Union
membership peaked in 1981 and has fallen ever since.
Union density too has fallen with less than a quarter of
German employees now members. And as in Britain, the
sustained decline in membership and density seems 
to have been the consequence of both external factors –
such as changes in the composition of the workforce –
and internal factors – unions’ own structures and policies.
The resulting financial problems have not made union
revitalisation easier. Union mergers have been one
consequence with the emergence of a small number of
multi-sector unions. But again as in Britain, it is an open
question whether a smaller number of larger unions is
better suited to the modern world. And although unions
in Germany have made innovative use of modern
information and communications technologies to deliver
services to members, it is doubtful whether this can
compensate for the loss of face-to-face contact and
organisational withdrawal from low membership areas.
Both countries have also experienced a decentralisation of
collective bargaining and a substantial decline in
bargaining coverage. But in contrast to Britain, multi-
employer collective bargaining still dominates in Germany,
even though there has been a shift of bargaining
competences to the plant level in sectoral agreements.
Still, two out of three German employees work in an
establishment that is covered either by multi-employer or
single-employer bargaining. As with membership, unions
in both countries have had problems in organising new
establishments, which implies that bargaining coverage
can be expected to decline further, particularly in the
private sector.
The fall in membership and bargaining coverage goes
hand in hand with a decline in bargaining power and
problems of legitimacy and political effectiveness. Union
relations with the government and the Social Democratic
Party have soured since March 2003, when Chancellor
Schröder outlined his reform programme for reinvigorating
the stagnating German economy. This included reforms of
the labour market and the welfare state – such as changes
to job protection law and unemployment insurance –that
were fiercely but unsuccessfully opposed by the unions.
In the political arena as well as in the fields of collective
bargaining and industrial relations, the German unions
face difficult decisions, in particular whether to be more
pragmatic and try to influence reforms or to oppose them
for ideological reasons. Behind the mask of a unified
labour movement in Germany there is a whole range of
different union views and strategies, ranging from ‘social
partnership’ to ‘countervailing power’ against both
employers and government. It is high time for the unions
to define what they stand for in the twenty-first century
and to find convincing strategies for reversing the various
economic and political trends working against them. 
in brief...
‘Trade Unions in Germany: On the Road to
Perdition?’ by Claus Schnabel is a chapter in
Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise?
(Routledge, 2005). Claus Schnabel is at the
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg.
Two out of three German employees
work in an establishment covered by
collective bargaining
Behind the mask of a
unified German labour
movement, there is a
range of different
views and strategies
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From the Webbs to the Web:
a new union form?
An inappropriate pessimism dominates
discussions of the future of unions. Yes, union density is
falling in the private sector and union influence is falling in
Britain and many other countries. And, yes, the finances
of many unions are shaky. But some unions are
responding to their difficulties by undertaking innovations
using the internet that have the potential to improve
union services and lower costs to members. 
In Britain, these innovations include the website
www.unionreps.org.uk, on which union reps share
information; the website www.worksmart.org.uk, which
provides information about rights at work to both union
and non-union workers; and a weekly email bulletin on
occupational health and safety. Nearly 70% of union reps
who use the unionreps.org website communicate with
their members through email, creating an ‘e-unionism’
with great potential for rapid delivery of services to
members at minimal cost.
Innovations in the United States include a massive email
list – Working Families Network – that allows the AFL-CIO
(the US equivalent of the Trades Union Congress) to
contact millions of members and friends of labour and ask
them to participate in campaigns of public interest, as well
as to get volunteers for demonstrations. It also includes
various experiments with ‘open source’ union forms, in
which workers unable to gain a collective bargaining
contract use a union website to connect activists.
Last summer, the AFL-CIO initiated an ‘affiliate
organisation’, Working America (www.workingamerica.org),
whose website offers legal advice on overtime issues as
well as diverse other information. Combining the internet
with face-to-face contact, by July 2005, the AFL-CIO had
signed up 900,000 workers in 10 US cities to the new
organisation (though there is still uncertainty about what
services it will deliver to members and how it will finance
itself). Other US union organisations have also developed
such open source forms, some along occupational lines,
others at particular firms such as the Communication
Workers of America local at IBM.
These efforts to use the internet will expand, if only
because they allow unions the opportunity to reach many
workers and workplaces at low cost, irrespective of the
attitudes of employers. If successful, the innovations will
profoundly affect union membership and the institution of
the union. If unions find the right way to combine online
activities with offline activities, possibly in local
communities, and to use their expertise on labour issues
to build loyalty to the institution, they could create a new
form of worker power in place of strikes, based on their
ability to generate support for workers outside any given
workplace from a broader union community.
Unions in Britain, the United States and virtually every
other advanced capitalist country have grown in sudden
spurts, usually around a new union structure that reaches
workers in a different way. With unions engaged in diverse
innovations, it is possible that an open source form may
find the ‘killer application’ that touches off a new spurt.
‘From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of
the Internet to Reviving Union Fortunes’ by
Richard Freeman is a chapter in Trade Unions:
Resurgence or Demise? (Routledge, 2005).
Richard Freeman is Professor of Economics at
Harvard University and a senior research fellow
in CEP’s labour markets programme.
The internet allows
unions the opportunity
to reach many workers
and workplaces 
at low cost
in brief...
Combining online activities with 
offline activities could create 
a new form of worker power
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Performance pay for teachers:
is it working?
The introduction of performance-related
pay in England’s schools has had a generally 
bad press. But David Marsden and Richard Belfield
find that it is starting to have a positive impact 
both on school management and pupils’ academic
achievements.
Performance pay and performance management
were first introduced into schools in England and
Wales in the autumn of 2000. With their specific focus
on both the contribution of teachers’ performance to
the achievements of their pupils and how they can be
measured and linked to the overall targets set for
schools, these reforms represent a radical departure
from long-established methods of paying teachers and
managing state schools. But are they working? To
answer this question, we have been carrying out a
regular survey of more than 300 head teachers and
1,000 classroom teachers since just before the new
system was launched.
The new performance management scheme gives
heads a mechanism for linking teachers’ classroom
objectives with those of the school as a whole. It
involves annual performance reviews for all teachers
in which they agree targets for the coming year with
their team leaders or the head. There is also a
‘threshold assessment’ of performance, which is
situated at the top of the old pay scale. If teachers
pass, they then move onto a new upper pay scale in
which progression depends on performance.
Passing the threshold brings a large salary increase
and movement up the upper pay scale. When it was
first introduced, the pay rise would take the annual
salary of teachers who were at the top of the old pay
scale from about £24,000 to £26,000 with the
opportunity to rise to £30,000. This was at a time
when average white-collar full-time annual earnings
stood at a little over £25,000.
The success of the new performance pay system
can be evaluated in a number of ways:
■ whether the opportunity to earn more has
improved motivation and given teachers’ greater
incentives;
■ whether the performance reviews have improved
co-ordination of teachers’ efforts through better
goal-setting;
■ whether the system has helped to improve
management within schools;
■ and whether it has led to better academic results
for pupils.
Motivation and incentives
Only a small minority of the classroom teachers we
survey say that performance pay gives them extra
incentives and motivates increased effort. This fits
with other studies of teachers’ attitudes to financial
rewards: they look to other aspects of their work for
positive motivation. Nevertheless, a greater
proportion of younger than older teachers think that
the extended pay scales make it more worthwhile to
stay in teaching.
Goal-setting
In contrast to the rather negative findings on
motivation, much larger numbers of both teachers and
heads think that performance management has helped
to improve goal-setting within their schools. What’s
more, the percentage of those reporting improvements
has increased with each wave of the survey.
Initially, there were widespread fears that heads
would adopt simplistic goals based on test pass rates.
In contrast, examples include reviewing performance
weaknesses of a whole class or school year and
agreeing targets that would seek to address these,
such as narrowing the gap between girls’ and boys’
achievements in a particular subject. This suggests
how reviews can help to focus teachers’ efforts less on
weaknesses in their own performance and more on
the needs of their pupils and the school.
in brief...
Performance management makes
it possible to integrate classroom
teaching objectives with those of
the whole school
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In practice, the new scheme leaves quite a lot of
freedom to individual schools in how they approach
performance reviews, and this no doubt helps to
explain why a sizeable minority of heads and teachers
report negatively. We also find that schools with
improved goal-setting are more likely to ‘benchmark’
their educational practices against those of schools
that are doing well in the league tables.
School management
Before the new system was introduced, we speculated
that heads might adopt one of two potential
strategies when implementing performance
management. They might act like ‘fire-fighters’, filling
in the required forms simply to get the extra money
for teachers’ salaries. Or they might adopt a
‘reformer’ strategy, using the new provisions as an
opportunity to improve the way the school was
managed.
In the first year, it seems that many, but not all,
schools adopted the ‘fire-fighter’ strategy. But by the
2004 survey, the percentage of ‘reformer’ schools had
increased. One aspect of the change has been the
extent to which heads use ‘joined-up’ targets, linking
those of their teachers to the wider objectives of the
school, as set out, for example, in the school
improvement plan.
We measure this by comparing the survey
responses of heads, team leaders and classroom
teachers in the same school. If all three categories
report that the new system has improved goal-setting,
then it is likely that the school has a fairly systematic
approach. Lack of agreement might indicate that
policies are not felt in reality throughout the school.
On this measure, we find that a growing percentage
of schools in our sample has taken the new system as
an opportunity to reform school management:
between 15% and 25% have adopted the ‘reformer’
strategy, and this proportion has grown from 10-20%
in 2001 to 20-30% in 2004.
Academic results
So does all this make any difference to pupils’
achievements? We compare schools that showed an
improvement in goal-setting between 2001 and 2004,
with those that showed an improvement in their pupil
results over the same period relative to other local
schools, looking at Key Stage 2 results for primary
schools and GCSE results for secondary schools.
Despite the rather small sample of schools for
which we have a complete set of observations, we
find that schools that improve their goal-setting also
improve their academic results. Statistically, there is a
less than 10% likelihood that this could have come
about by chance.
Thus, performance pay and management for
teachers seem to have achieved a moderate success so
far. And if the share of ‘reformer’ schools continues to
grow, then it is likely to bring longer-lasting benefits
to children and the wider community. Though much
maligned, reforms like these are potentially a key
means by which democratic governments can influence
the work of public sector professional employees. 
Schools that improve
their goal-setting also
improve their pupils’
academic results
This article summarises ‘Performance 
Pay for Teachers: Linking Individual 
and Organisational-level Targets’ 
by David Marsden and Richard Belfield,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 703
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0703.pdf).
David Marsden is Professor of 
Industrial Relations at LSE and a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Richard Belfield is a research
assistant in CEP’s labour markets programme.
Further reading
David Marsden and Richard Belfield (2004),
‘Unions, Performance-related Pay and
Procedural Justice: The Case of Classroom
Teachers’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 660
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0660.pdf).
David Marsden (2000), ‘Teachers Before the
''Threshold''’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 454
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0454.pdf).
T
he student revolt of
May 1968 led to chaos
across France,
temporarily shaking the
economic and political
establishment. But
while the revolution was short-lived, it had
significant long-term consequences – 
not only for the students taking 
important exams that year but also for the
next generation. It turns out that the
revolutionaries of 1968 were successful 
in ways that they were unlikely to 
have foreseen.
The famous ‘1968 events’ coincided
with the examination season and, in
universities, exams became a central
aspect of the bargaining process between
students and the authorities. The
rebellious students successfully bargained
for ‘light-touch’ exams ‘to avoid harming
students who have spent a lot of time
struggling for a better university’.
But it was not only university exams
that were affected in 1968. That year, the
baccalauréat exam – success at which
guarantees entry to university – only
involved oral tests. As a result, as Figure
1 shows, the pass rate increased
enormously. 
Our research finds that this lowering
of thresholds at an early – and highly
selective – stage of the higher education
system enabled a significant proportion of
students born between 1947 and 1950
(particularly those born in 1948 and 1949)
to pursue more years of higher education
that would otherwise have been possible.
This was followed by a significant
increase in their subsequent wages and
occupational attainment, particularly for
students from a middle-class family
background. What’s more, because there
is a relationship between parents’
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Trends in cohort size and the number of students 
passing the baccalauréat exam
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Sources: The French Ministry of Education and the French Statistical Office.
The size of the cohort for year t corresponds to the number of people born at t minus
19 (19 is the median age of candidates). The two series are normalised to 1 in 1945.
Children
of the revolution
New research by Eric Maurin and Sandra
McNally reveals that France’s short-lived
‘revolution’ of May 1968 had long-term benefits
for the angry students – and later for their
children. These findings have important
implications for the debate about widening
access to higher education.
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educational achievement and that of their
children, these returns were transmitted to
the next generation.
These findings are of great relevance
to the current debate in many countries
about widening access to higher
education. The 1968 events are an
important example of a situation where
lower thresholds at critical stages enabled
those on the margin to go to university or
pursue further years of higher education.
The experience of 1968 suggests that
enabling the ‘marginal’ person to enter
higher education can result in high private
returns in the labour market and, because
this is transmitted to the next generation,
may have a long-run effect on overall
educational attainment.
We use 1968 as a ‘natural
experiment’ to address key questions
about the effects of education: what is its
true causal impact on labour market
outcomes like the jobs people end up
doing and the wages they earn? And
what is the causal relationship between
the education of parents and that of 
their children?
It is normally very difficult to identify
the causal effects of education on
subsequent outcomes. We estimate the
returns to education using an approach
that involves finding a variable that
predicts years of higher education without
otherwise influencing the outcome
measure such as wages. In this context,
we can use birth cohort as that variable
and also the fact that within the most
affected cohorts (1948 and 1949), there
was a disproportionate effect on the
education of middle-class students.
The essence of our results can be very
simply illustrated using data from the
French Labour Force Survey (l’Enquête
Emploi) on men in their forties. Figure 2
shows the net effect of birth cohort on
the probability of these men having at
least a university diploma and of them
being in an upper-level white-collar job.
The pattern in the data shows a marked
similarity for the two different effects and
provides good prima facie evidence of the
relationship between educational and
labour market outcomes, with a
pronounced upward shift for people born
in 1949.
This 1949 cohort, the one whose
education was most substantively affected
by the 1968 events, comprised students
taking the baccalauréat exam at the end
of their secondary education. And within
this group, middle-class students were
much more likely to be affected. This is
because people from a lower social
background are more likely to leave
education before taking the exam and
people from a higher social background
are more likely to pass the exam even
without the advantage of easier exams. 
We use these facts to estimate the
relationship between wages and years of
higher education using data for the 1949
birth cohort and two control groups that
were much less likely to have been
affected by the relaxation of exam
standards in 1968, namely the 1946 and
1952 birth cohorts. Specifically, belonging
to the 1949 birth cohort is used to predict
years of higher education and thus reveal
the true causal relationship between
education and wages.
The results indicate that each
additional year spent in higher education
increases wages by about 14 percentage
points and the probability of holding a
high-status occupation by 10 percentage
points. These are high estimates and
suggest that the private returns to an
additional year of higher education may
be at least as large as to an additional year
of compulsory schooling.
We can’t say whether employers were
rewarding the ‘human capital’ gains from
additional years of higher education or the
signalling value of these years (and the
educational credentials). But we can say
that enabling the marginal university
entrant to gain years of higher education
led to high private gains. In fact, we
estimate that the effect on wages
corresponds to a gain in permanent
income which exceeds private costs (that
is, forgone earnings) by a factor of 7 and
which exceeds the social costs of one year
of education by an even larger factor. (The
annual cost of higher education in France
is about £4,400 per student.)
We might hypothesise that a similar
group could be affected in this way by
policies designed to widen access to
higher education – to the extent that this
involves some lowering of thresholds and
hence making the system less selective. 
46 47 48 49 50 51 52
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
Cohort effect on college dip
Cohort effects on occupational level
Figure 2:
The net effects of birth cohort on the probability of 
having at least a university diploma and on the probability of
being in an upper-level white-collar position
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The returns to an extra
year of higher education
may be at least as large
as to an extra year of
compulsory schooling
We use a similar approach to analyse
whether the gain in education and
earnings for the affected cohorts had an
impact on the outcomes of their children.
More generally, we use 1968 to address
the important policy issue as to whether
providing additional education to parents
is transmitted to the next generation, thus
breaking the cycle of low intergenerational
mobility that occurs in many countries.
The outcome we consider corresponds
to children’s ‘educational advancement’ at
the age of 15. This describes the
difference between the actual grade of
the adolescent concerned and the normal
grade for his or her age group. France is
one of several countries where grade
repetition is an important phenomenon
(most children repeat at least one grade at
school). Grade repetition is strongly
correlated with other measures of
educational achievement, and
international data show that children who
repeat a grade are likely to obtain much
lower scores in maths, reading or science
at age 15. 
The results show that the benefits
accruing to fathers born in 1948 and 1949
were transmitted to the next generation in
terms of educational advancement. The
children of fathers who benefited from the
relaxation of exam standards in 1968 were
doing significantly better at school than
the children of those born too early or too
late to be affected in the same way (the
1946 or 1952 birth cohorts). We use these
facts to estimate the causal relationship
between fathers’ education and their
children’s educational advancement, and
the results suggest a strong positive
relationship.
But it is unlikely that fathers’
education was the only family resource
affected by the 1968 events. Since
similarly educated men and women are
more likely to marry each other, the
estimated impact of a father’s years of
higher education reflects both the direct
effect of his resources and the indirect
effect of his wife’s resources on the
educational performance of their children.
Our estimates indicate that the true
causal impact of parental education on
children’s outcomes is considerably larger
than is suggested by more descriptive
analysis. Measures to improve family
resources via parents’ education are
therefore an effective way to improve
outcomes for the next generation.
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Measures to improve
family resources via
parents’ education 
are an effective way to
improve outcomes for 
the next generation
France’s student
revolutionaries of 1968
were successful in 
ways that they were
unlikely to have foreseen
Eric Maurin is research director at Paris-
Jourdan Sciences Economiques and a
research affiliate of the Centre for Economic
Policy Research. Sandra McNally is a CEP
research fellow and deputy director of the
Centre for the Economics of Education (CEE).
More details on the research discussed here
are in ‘Vive la Révolution! Long Term Returns
of 1968 to the Angry Students’, CEE
Discussion Paper No. 49
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp49.pdf).
The study is also available in French: ‘Vive la
Révolution! Les Bénéfices de Long Terme de
Mai 1968’, La République des Idées, Paris
(http://www.repid.com/IMG/pdf/doc-95.pdf).
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T
he division of Germany after
World War II and the
reunification of East and
West Germany in 1990 can
be thought of as a ‘natural
experiment’ in which it is possible to assess
the importance of market access for
economic development. With the
foundation of East and West Germany as
separate states in 1949, West German cities
close to the border went from being at the
heart of an integrated Germany to being on
the edge of the Western world. As a result,
these cities experienced a disproportionate
loss of market access, losing numerous
nearby trading partners with whom they
could previously interact at low cost.
Our research finds that following
division, West German cities close to the
new border experienced a marked decline
in population growth relative to other
West German cities. We estimate that over
the 40-year period of division, there was a
decline in their annual rate of population
growth of 0.75 percentage points, which
implies a cumulative reduction of about
one third in the size of border cities
relative to non-border cities.
The difference in population growth
rates for the two groups of cities was not
apparent prior to division but emerged
immediately afterwards. And the effect
was strongest in the 1950s and 1960s,
declining over time. This is consistent with
gradual adjustment to a new long-run
distribution of population. We also find
evidence to confirm that our results are
capturing loss of market access rather
than other potential explanations, such as
systematic differences in city structure,
destruction during World War II or the fear
of further armed conflict.
Germany’s post-war division
Following World War II, Germany's
boundaries changed dramatically. Map 1
illustrates how the pre-war country was
divided into four different parts: West and
East Germany and two areas that became
parts of Poland and Russia. West Germany
made up roughly 53% of the pre-war area
and just over 58% of the pre-war
population of 69.3 million. East Germany
comprised 23% of the area and 22% of
the population. And the areas that
became parts of Poland and Russia
contained 24% of the area and 14% of
the population. The remaining 6% of the
population was in East and West Berlin.
The political process leading to the
division of Germany took several
unexpected turns. While various proposals
to divide the country after its eventual
defeat were discussed during the early
phase of World War II, the United States
and Russia backed off such plans towards
the end of the war. Instead, the main
planning effort was to organise the
military occupation of Germany. Early on,
it was decided that separate zones of
occupation would be allocated to the
American, British and Russian armies. The
planning process for the zones began in
spring 1943, negotiations continued
during 1944 and the protocol formalising
the zones was signed in London in
September 1944.
The protocol divided Germany into
zones of roughly equal population after
excluding the areas expected to become
parts of Poland and Russia. In line with the
location of the advancing armies, the
northern part of what would later become
West Germany was to be occupied by
British forces, the southern part was to be
controlled by American forces, and the
remaining eastern parts of the country
were to be occupied by the Russian army.
In addition, it was agreed that American,
British and Russian forces would jointly
occupy Berlin. The protocol was modified
in 1945 to create a small French zone in
the south-western corner of Germany,
which was achieved by reducing the size
of the American and British zones.
As tensions between the Western
Location,
location, location
How important is access to markets as a driver
of economic prosperity? In new research
Stephen Redding and Daniel Sturm address
this question by analysing the post-war division
of Germany and its impact on the border cities
in the West suddenly cut off from their nearby
trading partners.
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allies and Russia increased with the onset
of the cold war, the zones of occupation
became the basis for the foundation of
separate East and West German states in
1949. The territory of West Germany was
the combined area of the American,
British and French zones, and was
extended to include the Saarland from
1957. East Germany was founded on the
Russian zone.
While the two new countries
maintained some politically motivated and
largely symbolic economic co-operation,
any local economic links between areas on
either side of the border were entirely
suppressed from 1949, when East
Germany introduced central planning.
From 1952, there were extensive border
fortifications and the new border between
East and West Germany became one of
the most sealed and best guarded in the
world. Limited transit between East and
West Berlin remained possible until 1961,
when the Berlin Wall was built.
The division of Germany was
formalised in international treaties and
was generally believed to be permanent.
But growing dissatisfaction among East
Germans about heavy restrictions on
mobility, lack of personal freedom and the
declining performance of the economy led
to large-scale demonstrations in 
1989, culminating in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. East
Germany rapidly disintegrated and only
eleven months later, East and West
Germany were formally reunified on 
3 October 1990.
New economic geography
Our research examines the implications of
German divison and reunification using the
analytical techniques of the ‘new economic
geography’ (Fujita et al, 1999; Helpman,
1998). In these models, the location of
economic activity and the distribution of
population across cities are determined by
the balance between ‘agglomeration’ and
‘dispersion’ – those forces that attract firms
and workers to large markets and those
that repel them from those markets.
Agglomeration forces arise from
increasing returns to scale, transport costs
and consumer preferences for variety. Firms
like to concentrate production because of
economies of scale, and they like to
concentrate production close to large
markets because of transport costs.
Workers like to consume a variety of goods
and, combined with transport costs, this
means that they like to be near to where
many firms produce.
Dispersion forces arise from the limited
Map 1:
Germany before World War II
Notes: The map shows Germany in its pre-WWII borders
(usually referred to as the 1937 borders) and the division of
Germany into an area that became part of Russia, an area that
became part of Poland, East Germany and West Germany.
The West German cities in our sample that are within 
75 kilometres of the German-German border are denoted by
squares, all other cities by circles.
Following Germany’s
division, West German
cities close to the 
border experienced a
marked relative decline
in population
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supply of immobile resources like land and
housing. As the size of a city grows, the
prices of immobile resources increase,
raising workers' cost of living. Workers are
assumed to be geographically mobile and
will relocate until the real wage is
equalised across cities.
We use the model to simulate the
division of Germany. The key prediction
that emerges from the simulation is that
West German cities close to the border
should decline relative to other cities
because they are disproportionately
affected by the loss of access to markets
and sources of supply on the other side of
the border. Among the border cities, the
decline in relative size is predicted to be
greater for smaller cities, where their own
markets are smaller and where access to
economic activity elsewhere is
correspondingly more important.
Changing populations 
of West German cities,
1919-2002
To examine whether the predictions of the
economic geography model are
confirmed, we examine data for the
period 1919-2002 and measure the
population changes in 119 West German
cities that had more than 20,000
inhabitants in 1919. Pre-war populations
are only available for the census years of
1919, 1925, 1933 and 1939. For the post-
war period, we have data at 10-year
intervals between 1950 and 1980 plus
1988 and 1992 (immediately before and
after reunification) and 2002. Table 1 lists
the 20 cities in our data that we classify as
border cities, those located within 
75 kilometres of the border. Our basic
empirical strategy is to compare the
population growth of these cities 
with the population growth of the
remaining cities both before and after
Germany was divided.
Figure 1 shows the changing city
populations over time of the two groups
as a whole. (For each group, population is
expressed as an index relative to its 1919
value, and the two vertical lines indicate
the year 1949 when the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany) and the
German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) were established and the year
1990 when the two countries were
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Indices of border and non-border city populations
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Bamberg Hannover
Bayreuth Hildesheim
Braunschweig Hof
Celle Kassel
Coburg Kiel
Erlangen Lübeck
Fulda Lüneberg 
Göttingen Neumünster
Goslar Schweinfurt
Hamburg Würzberg 
Table 1:
The 20 West German 
‘border cities’
Those lying within 75 kilometres of the former 
border between East and West Germany
Population in border
cities actually fell
between 1960 and 
1980, while population in
non-border cities
continued to grow
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negative effect of division on border cities.
Following reunification in 1990, there
was a step-increase in city populations in
West Germany, reflecting migration from
the former East Germany. This migration
raised population in non-border cities by
somewhat more than in border cities.
From 1992, population in the border cities
grew somewhat faster than in non-border
cities, which is consistent with the
beginning of a recovery arising from
improved market access after
reunification.
Is market access the
explanation?
The observed decline of the border cities is
consistent with market access being an
important determinant of regional
property as predicted by the economic
geography model. Furthermore, the results
are hard to explain in terms of institutions
or natural endowments, which are the
two main competing explanations for
reunited.) Figure 2 represents the
difference between the two population
indices, indicating the impact of division
on the population of border cities relative
to non-border cities.
Before World War II, the population
growth of border and non-border cities
was very similar, with the former growing
slightly slower during the Great Depression
of the early 1930s but recovering their
trend growth rate by 1939. During World
War II and its immediate aftermath, border
cities experienced marginally higher
population growth than non-border cities,
probably due to migration from East
Germany and the areas of pre-war
Germany that became part of Poland and
Russia.
This pattern changed sharply after
1949, when East and West Germany
emerged as separate states with different
economic systems and local economic
links were severed. From this point, West
German cities close to the new border
experienced substantially lower rates of
population growth than non-border cities.
Population in the border cities actually fell
between 1960 and 1980, whereas
population in non-border cities continued
to grow.
By the early 1980s, the discrepancy in
rates of population growth was beginning
to close, which is consistent with the idea
that the negative effect of division on
border cities had gradually worked itself
out and the distribution of population in
West Germany was approaching a new
‘steady state’. But the slower decline of
the border cities during the 1970s and
1980s may also be explained in part by
the extensive regional policy programmes
aimed at supporting the areas close to the
border with East Germany, which grew
substantially during this period. To the
extent that these subsidy programmes
were successful in promoting the
development of the border regions, our
estimates provide a lower bound to the
Over the 40 years of division, there was a
cumulative reduction of one third in the size
of border cities relative to non-border cities 
22
CentrePiece Summer 2005
23
variations in economic prosperity. Our
sample of West German cities shared the
same institutions and also had very similar
natural endowments over time.
Nonetheless, there are other possible
explanations for the results:
■ First, cities close to the new border could
have specialised in industries that
experienced a secular decline in the
post-war period.
■ Second, the border cities could have
suffered a disproportionate amount of
war-related damage, which may have
hindered their post-war development.
■ Finally, people may have moved away
from the border out of a belief that
these cities would be particularly
vulnerable in case of a new armed
conflict in Western Europe.
We provide a number of additional
pieces of evidence to show that the
decline of the border cities is explained by
their loss of market access and not by
these alternative explanations:
■ First, we use a measure of market
potential – a widely used proxy for
market access – to estimate the loss of
market access due to the new border for
each city in our dataset. The drop in
market potential caused by the new
border provides a complete explanation
of the differential growth of the border
cities.
■ Second, as suggested by the new
economic geography model, the decline
of the border cities was not uniform.
Smaller cities were disproportionately
affected by the loss of hinterland.
■ Third, those parts of the population that
were no longer economically active
reacted less to the imposition of the
border than the economically active
population.
■ Finally, we establish that neither the
degree of war-related destruction nor
patterns of specialisation can explain the
relative decline of the border cities.
Our research findings do not imply
that institutions and natural endowments
are irrelevant in determining economic
development: the experience of East
Germany during the period of division is
itself an interesting case study
demonstrating the relevance of
institutions. The contribution of our work
is to provide clear evidence for the
importance of market access as a driver of
economic prosperity.
Smaller cities were
disproportionately
affected by being cut off
from their nearby trading
partners in East Germany
This article summarises ‘The Costs of
Remoteness: Evidence from German Division
and Reunification’ by Stephen Redding and
Daniel Sturm, CEP Discussion Paper No. 688
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0688.pdf).
Stephen Redding is a senior lecturer in
economics at LSE and a group leader in
CEP’s research programme on globalisation.
Daniel Sturm is assistant professor at the
University of Munich and an associate of
CEP’s globalisation programme.
Further reading
Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman and Anthony
J Venables (1999), The Spatial Economy:
Cities, Regions and International Trade,
MIT Press.
Elhanan Helpman (1998), ‘The Size of
Regions’, in David Pines, Efraim Sadka and
Itzhak Zilcha (eds), Topics in Public
Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Germany’s experiences
provide clear evidence
for the importance of
market access as a driver
of economic prosperity
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The supposed problems
of small remote
economies have long
occupied the economics
profession. It is well
established that smaller economies –
those with populations of up to 4 million
people, the size of Singapore – are less
diversified and more vulnerable to shocks.
And yet it has been hard to find evidence
either that they grow less rapidly or that
they have lower incomes per person.
But as the world economy becomes
more integrated, small economies are
starting to feel greater competitive
pressure and to lose some of the
advantages they had previously taken for
granted, such as preferential trade access
to the markets of rich countries. These
concerns have been articulated in
international trade negotiations and the
creation of dedicated organisations like
the World Bank and Commonwealth
Secretariat’s Small States Forum. 
Our research addresses a key element
of this debate: whether the costs of doing
business are higher in smaller, more
remote economies. If so, such economies
may be unable to generate acceptable
incomes for their residents – and the
problem will be exacerbated if they lose
their trade preferences.
The problem of smallness
The economist’s stock answer to
complaints about the costs of smallness is
to argue that international trade allows a
small economy to buy from the most
efficient producers in the world and to
reap at least some economies of scale by
concentrating production in a very small
number of sectors.
But when we add remoteness to the
equation, this response is attenuated
because, even setting aside the risks
inherent in specialisation, trade is costly.
Once the cost of transporting goods to
and from a remote economy is taken into
account (a small economy facing given
world prices has to pay for transport both
ways), incomes will necessarily be lower
than in bigger and better-located
economies. Moreover, the extra transport
costs will typically be larger the smaller the
economy since consignment sizes are
smaller and infrastructure less developed.
If transport is prohibitively expensive, the
small economy’s costs are inflated by the
absence of economies of scale.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem.
Imagine an industry in which a
manufactured good produced in the
average-sized (median) economy requires
$20 of power, $40 of materials and $40
of labour, and sells on the world market
for $100. If a small economy pays 50%
extra for its power because it lacks scale
and 50% extra for its materials because of
transport costs, it only has $10 left over
for labour. If labour productivity is the
same as in the average economy, wages
will a quarter of those in the average
economy.
Now consider a ‘micro economy’
where power and materials cost twice
their average economy levels: there is
nothing left for labour. Even if wages were
zero, this industry would still be unviable.
What can be done?
Improving efficiency to reduce the
value of inputs could solve the problem,
but failing that, the small economy needs
higher prices if it is to keep this industry. A
niche market – a unique product with
high demand – is one source, but more
common is a trade preference. If there
were a market that imported this good
and levied a 40% tariff, its internal price
would be $140. If it were to exempt the
small economy from the tariff, the latter
could earn $140 per unit on its exports
and suddenly the industry is viable, albeit
still with lower returns to labour.
The worry would then be what
happens if improved efficiency elsewhere
drives the world price down? Think of this
as the emergence of China, perhaps. If
Small isn’t beautiful:
the cost disadvantages of
small remote economies
Small remote economies like Anguilla and
Vanuatu face huge competitive challenges,
not least the higher costs of doing business.
L Alan Winters and Pedro Martins measure
the size of their cost disadvantages and explore
potential solutions.
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the world price fell to, say, $85, the 40%
tariff would now yield a price of only
$119 – below costs again. Or suppose the
tariff fell in a round of trade liberalisation
or other countries objected to the
preference: the small economy would be
back in trouble again. These are the
shocks that loom for the world’s small
remote economies.
Cost disadvantages
We have assembled survey data on
business costs for 92 economies from four
sources: the Economist Intelligence Unit,
which surveys 54 medium-sized and large
countries; and Imani Capricorn, the
Caribbean Community and the Pacific
Islands Forum, which were commissioned
by the Commonwealth Secretariat to
survey small economies in their areas. 
The questions covered air and sea
transport costs for exports and imports,
the costs and reliability of utilities, the
wages of different types of labour, taxes,
rents, labour shortages and policy regimes.
Using these data, we can examine the
relationships between country size and
different cost components. Figure 2, for
example, illustrates how the costs of
sending a 20’ full container from
Yokohama to a country’s capital fall as
population size increases. 
We can also calculate the predicted
cost disadvantage for four specimen
countries – chosen to represent micro
(12,000 inhabitants), very small (200,000),
‘threshold’ (1.6 million) and small
economies (4 million) – relative to the
average country of roughly 10 million
inhabitants. The population values for
these representative countries correspond
Median Small Micro Micro-Pref.s
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Figure 1:
Excess costs cut incomes
Figure 2:
Shipping costs ‘from Yokohama’
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‘Micro’ and very small
economies – with 200,000
inhabitants or fewer –
face particularly tough
challenges
Tourist industries on
small tropical islands
may be viable but 
they need to manage
costs carefully
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to Anguilla, Vanuatu, Botswana, Singapore
and Hungary, respectively.
Our calculations suggest that there are
significant costs to small size in almost all
areas. Table 1 summarises these estimates,
indicating, for example, that there are very
high cost disadvantages for seafreight and
utilities and rather lower cost disadvantages
for airfreight. And while small countries
apparently have an advantage in rents, this
is because rents reflect the value of land in
commercial exploitation. The negative
numbers reinforce the view that small
economies are disadvantaged: it is obvious
why a plot in Manhattan costs more than
one in Vanuatu.
The next step is to aggregate these cost
disadvantage factors into overall
competitive disadvantages for small
economies in three potential export
industries: electronic assembly, clothing and
tourism. Using data from nearly 60
countries on the structure of costs of
supplying exports to the world market, we
can bring the cost disadvantage factors
together to calculate an index of the excess
costs of exports from small economies.
For the two manufacturing sectors,
the competitive disadvantage of
‘Singapore’ is around 2.7%, well within
the likely range of data error and also
easily coped with by good management.
For a Botswana-sized economy, the excess
is around 5%, again not a huge worry.
But for the very small and micro
economies, the size disadvantages of 14%
and 36% respectively are huge. For
tourism, in which personal air travel
figures large in the cost structure, the
disadvantages are larger but have the
same pattern as in manufacturing.
If these cost disadvantages cannot be
passed onto customers – if small
economies have to sell their goods and
services at world prices – then the only
way that very small economies can export
is if some input accepts lower payments
than it would get in the average economy.
Quantifying these ‘penalties’ requires an
assumption about which inputs have
unavoidably higher costs and which can
be squeezed to accommodate the excess
costs elsewhere.
Table 2 outlines the results of five
exercises for the overall clothing sector.
The top row shows the cost disadvantage
factors, while the remaining rows report
income penalties. The first assumes that
only tradable material inputs and final
outputs face excess costs and that all the
rest of the economy can be squeezed to
maintain competitiveness. Even here, the
penalties are large for micro and very small
economies.
The next row assumes that traded
inputs, outputs and utilities have
unavoidable cost excesses, and the third
that all intermediate inputs including
services do. In the latter, the burden falls
Area of cost* Micro Very small Threshold Small
Airfreight 31.8 4.1 -1.8 -1.7
Seafreight 219.6 70.5 20.5 9.1
Unskilled wages  60.1 31.6 13.6 6.6
Semi-skilled wages  22.4 12.1 5.3 2.6
Skilled wages 38.0 20.3 8.9 4.3
Telephone  (marginal costs) 98.5 47.2 19.1 9.0
Electricity (marginal costs) 93.1 47.0 19.7 9.4
Water (marginal costs) 0 0 0 0
Fuel 53.8 28.3 12.3 5.9
Personal air travel 115.7 56.8 23.3 11.0
Land rent -3.5 -17.2 -14.2 -8.9
*The figures cited are averages over several specific costs such as types 
of fuel or transport to different destinations
Table 1:
Summary of cost disadvantages
Percentage deviation of costs from those in the average economy
Economy size 
micro Very small threshold small
36.3 14.3 5.1 2.7
-40.1 -12.0 -3.1 -1.3
-44.7 -14.0 -3.8 -1.6
-86.0 -28.6 -8.4 -3.7
-263.9 -99.9 -34.0 -15.6
-161.0 -57.3 -18.4 -10.2
Table 2:
Cost disadvantages and income penalties in the clothing
sector (percentage of average economy costs or incomes)
Cost disadvantage factor
Income penalties
Inputs assumed to have
unavoidable cost
disadvantages
Internationally traded
intermediate inputs
Traded intermediate 
inputs and utilities
All intermediate inputs 
including services
All intermediate inputs 
and labour
All intermediate inputs 
and capital
Inputs bearing the
costs of inefficiency
All domestic supplies
primary factors,
services and non-
traded intermediates
Primary factors and
services
Primary factors
Capital
Labour
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on value added and it is plain that there is
almost no room for value added in micro
economies.
The final two rows divide up value
added. The data suggest that if capital
were the only residual claimant (that is,
excess wages are taken as given), then it
would earn negative returns in micro
economies and zero in very small ones.
Similarly, if wages were the residual
income recipient, then there would be
nothing to pay them in a micro economy
and they would be only 43% of average
wages in very small economies. For a
micro economy, this means that even if
wages were zero, total costs in
manufacturing would still exceed the
world price.
Local solutions?
While circumstances vary, it is clear that
micro and very small economies are likely
to face huge competitive challenges.
These economies will not be suitable
locations for industry or even tourism
unless they have very specific advantages
that allow them to charge substantially
higher prices than the average economy.
For hotels and tourism, the attractions of
small tropical islands are plausible and we
do see viable tourist industries on them.
Our results merely indicate that they will
need to manage costs carefully and will
never achieve mass market penetration.
But for manufacturing, the challenges
look very tough unless countries are
fortunate enough to find very specific
niche markets. One common response is
that since the costs of trade are so high,
small countries need the right to protect
their industries. This is completely
misguided. The problem is not that
imports can get in too easily but the very
opposite. Adding barriers to trade will
exacerbate not relieve the problems of
smallness. Even where local industries
could be successfully established behind
tariff walls, there is nothing to suggest
that such an approach would be
economically beneficial. Pursuing
comparative advantage maximises real
income – though it might not be sufficient
to provide an adequate standard of living.
A related response is to suggest
subsidising business investment in order to
overcome the cost disadvantages of
smallness. There are many arguments for
subsidising business in any economy. We
do not accept most of them but even if
we did, smallness adds nothing to them. If
business should not be subsidised in a
large economy, neither should it be in an
equivalent small one. Smallness does not
introduce distortions that need to be
countervailed, but an overall feasibility
constraint. If income is insufficient when it
maximised, it will certainly be insufficient if
is not maximised. And in the absence of
the market failures usually adduced to
justify subsidies, offering support to
manufacturing means income is not 
being maximised.
Another approach is to economise on
the costs of economic management or
statehood by combining to provide various
functions of government. We doubt
whether such efficiencies are sufficient to
overcome the disadvantages of smallness,
but there is undoubtedly a case for
seeking such efficiency gains. And in
places where smallness doesn’t seem to
matter – Luxembourg, Liechtenstein,
Andorra – the secret seems to be to
integrate extremely closely with the
neighbouring large countries.
But combining to produce government
services does not mean establishing
regional authorities and then maintaining
local capacity to influence and monitor
those authorities. It means a genuine
pooling of sovereignty with no local
shadowing – as, for example, Yorkshire
and Lancashire (counties that are larger
than many small economies) combine 
in England.
External sources of income
In the end, the sources of income
necessary to keep some small economies
going are likely to be external. Several
already exist and account for the relatively
high incomes that many small economies
currently maintain. Trade preferences allow
them to earn higher prices for exports, as
do niche markets like high-end tourism.
High remittances from expatriates support
some economies: Tonga, for example,
where 41% of income comes from
remittances. Aid supports others: the
Marshall Islands, for example, with aid
flows of $1,178 per person in 2002. 
The policy issue is that some of these
sources are under threat and not all 
very small economies seem likely to find
niche markets. 
The most favourable case for using a
one-off capital transfer as a solution is
probably building communications links. If
these are of good quality and inexpensive,
services relying on electronic interchange
may become competitive. But even if
exports avoid transport costs, imports do
not (and ships and planes have to return
home). And even in ‘electronic services’,
personal contacts are important so small
remote economies will still be
disadvantaged by their high travel costs
and long travel times.
Another possibility would be for rich
countries to subsidise small economy
industries. Unlike where small economies
fund their own subsidies, this could be
attractive. But the idea raises very
particular political challenges. Many of the
cost disadvantages of smallness apply
equally to insular or isolated parts of larger
countries. These disadvantaged regions are
often subsidised via regional policies, but if
small economies were permitted to have
export subsidies, it needs to be explained
why parts of larger economies should 
not. The reason is not hard to formulate,
but it may be uncomfortable: within a
country, people can move out of
uneconomic locations. 
The sources of income
necessary to keep 
small economies 
going are likely 
to be external
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Migration opportunities
Ultimately, we must face the possibility
that if small countries’ current trade
preferences are eroded and their incomes
are not somehow maintained in other
ways, many of their inhabitants will seek
to work abroad. Liberalising the temporary
movement of labour within the world
economy promises huge economic gains.
This could be a key factor for very small
economies, essentially allowing residents
to earn abroad but live and consume
mostly at home.
Temporary workers from small
countries would still be at a disadvantage
relative to those from larger ones: they
would face higher transport costs, 
smaller networks for finding jobs and
easing migratory strains, and higher
consumption costs at home. But especially
if they had preferential access – like the
guaranteed quotas that New Zealand
offers Polynesia – the benefits could
outweigh the disadvantages. 
The alternative to temporary mobility
would be permanent migration. In the
current political climate, this seems to
combine the worst fears of both sides: of
depopulation, and maybe eventual
cultural extinction, in the very small
economies; and of immigration in most
developed countries. But the latter fear is
not well-founded since the magnitudes
are so small.
Whether we are talking about
transfers or flows of people, it is perfectly
feasible for the rich countries to
accommodate the micro or very small
economies. For example, only around 3.1
million people (0.05% of the world’s
population) live in countries of below
200,000 population, 6.3 million in those
below 400,000 and 16.4 million in those
below 1 million population. These are not
insurmountable numbers by any yardstick.
Where smallness doesn’t
seem to matter, the secret
is to integrate extremely
closely with neighbouring
large countries
This article summarises ‘When Comparative
Advantage is Not Enough: Business Costs in
Small Remote Economies’ by L Alan Winters
and Pedro Martins, World Trade Review 3(3).
The same issue contains a comment by CEP’s
Anthony J Venables. Further discussion of the
data is in ‘Beautiful but Costly: Business Costs
in Small Remote Economies’, Economic Paper
67, Commonwealth Secretariat, and of the
policy issues is in ‘Policy Challenges for Small
Economies in a Globalising World’ by L Alan
Winters, mimeo, Development Research
Group, The World Bank.
L Alan Winters is Director of the
Development Research Group at the World
Bank and an associate in CEP’s globalisation
programme. Pedro Martins is in the
Economic and Policy Analysis Unit of the
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in Mozambique.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions
expressed in this article are entirely those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Board of Executive Directors of
the World Bank, the UNDP or the
governments they represent.
If small countries’ income
sources are not maintained,
many of their inhabitants
may seek to work abroad
Trade Unions 
Resurgence or Perdition?
David Metcalf and Sue Fernie (eds)
Routledge
288 pages  £21.99 p/b
ISBN 0415284120 
This, the third book in the important
Future of Trade Unions in Britain series,
features original research underpinned
with theory drawn from economics,
organisation theory, history and social
psychology. Written by some of the
leading scholars in the area, this book
gives an insight into union prospects for
the future and has important policy
implications for all parties concerned with
industrial relations: unions, employers 
and governments.
Unemployment:
Macroeconomic Performance
and the Labour Market 
Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell and
Richard Jackman 
Oxford University Press
672 pages  £27.99 h/b
ISBN 0199279179 
Now revised to include an analysis of
unemployment changes since 1991, it is
clear the authors' original model has stood
the test of time making this book a must
read for any student studying economics
at an advanced level. It aims to provide a
basis for better policy: showing how the
lessons learned from experience and
theory can be applied to greatly reduce
the waste and misery of high
unemployment.
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